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Introduction
According to the Vulgate of historical narratives the "confessional age" came to an end when Cardinal Richelieu entered the Thirty Year's War on the side of the Protestant powers in 1635.
Allegedly Richelieu relied on a wholly secularized conception of state interest that consolidated the emancipation of nation states from religious tutelage and left old ideals of a unified christianitas in ruins. 1 This interpretation is further fuelled by the circumstance that in 1637 Richelieu's strategy was opposed by the royal confessor Nicolas Caussin s.j. (1583-1651), who, accused by the Cardinal Minister of being a religious zealot who had criminally over-stepped the limits of his office, was immediately disgraced. 2 Caussin denied these accusations vehemently and insisted that counseling on the justice of war belonged to the core competence and duty of royal confessors according to moral theology. The closer one looks at the conflict the less credible seems the caricature of a battle between "reason of state" and In order to understand the incident and its wider implications more fully it is necessary to re-contextualize it, first within a longer debate over the merits of scholasticism and the authority of theological counsel in politics, and secondly within the short-term, specifically
French debate of the 1620s. We will therefore begin with a look back on the erosion of some fundamental concepts underpinning scholastic just war theory as well as theological expertise and authority at the end of the sixteenth century. Scholars generally assume that scholastic debates on just war had a "flair of the past" and were thus of little relevance by 1600, 4 but the reasons and dynamics of this development deserve closer scrutiny, and they are an important backdrop to our specific case in point. As will be explored in a second step, the theologians' difficulties in coming to terms with the cracks in their theoretical framework and with the effects of probabilism were further exacerbated during the Franco-Spanish struggle for European hegemony, as French polemicists started to attack scholastics in order to undermine the moral legitimacy of Spanish dominance. From the 1620s onwards, they targeted the Spanish system of theological counsel in politics 5 and ridiculed theological just war debates to discredit the authority of theological counselors in the eyes of the French public. The confrontation between Richelieu and Caussin, as well as the Cardinal's effortless victory over the confessor, suggest that this campaign had been rather successful. So successful that
Caussin in his apologetic writings, on which we focus in the final sections, went on to adjust his arguments. To answer the challenges to theological authority and to scholastics, he 3 combined a return to pristine Thomist principles with a highly original recovery of prophetical models based on skeptical readings of Old Testament sources.
Royal sins and scholastic doubts on just possession
Long into the seventeenth century, whoever was interested in how royal confessors should examine the conscience of rulers turned to the confessional manual by the Augustinian eremite Martín de Azpilcueta (1492-1586), generally known as "doctor Navarro". Since its first publication in 1552 the manual had undergone countless republications and translations and Caussin, too, in his clash with Richelieu, referred to it as an indisputable 'gold-standard'.
Navarro's manual contained a list of twenty-five questions for royal penitents, three of which directly concerned the justice of war. 6 In all three questions Navarro locked the definition of just war into the strictest Thomist principles: just war was limited to defensive and retributive operations, requiring just authority, just cause, and just intention. Its aim was to repair an injustice or damage suffered, such as the appropriation of one's possessions by another. This classical Thomist view was centered on the fundamental category of just possession and its defense, and by consequence war was a part of justice that pre-supposed guilt in the opponent.
Navarro insisted on the importance of just intention, excluding aggressive wars of conquest or glory from his definition of just war. 7 Interestingly, especially given the political and confessional context of his time, at no point did he mention the possibility of war for religious reasons, on which Aquinas had held a more ambiguous position. 8 Navarro's concept of just war was clearly indebted to that of the second scholastics, namely to Cardinal Cajetan and to Francisco de Vitoria (ca.1483/6-1546), who both rejected religious grounds for war. 9 Yet, while Vitoria's legitimate causes concerning the right of mission and of "humanitarian" protection of innocent victims allowed for supposedly religious causes to slide in through the backdoor, Navarro made no hint in this direction, nor 4 did he suggest a princely duty of defending the Church by armed means. What he did mention and emphasize, however, was the duty of Christian princes to keep and seek peace at all costs, so as to prevent the weakening of Christendom. The absence of religious causes in Navarro's questionnaire for royal confession, as well as the emphasis on the duty to avoid war through negotiation, by consequence considerably reduced the scope of just war. Navarro's tight definitions did not reflect some more flexible viewpoints on the matter that had developed already during the sixteenth century. When Caussin referred to Navarro as his normative framework in the 1640s he thus eclipsed a meanwhile highly complex debate. Indeed, as moral theology had moved on in the later sixteenth century some of Navarro's solid categories had become uncertain, and by Caussin's time many thought that moral theologians had lost their way.
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"Just possession", for example, a key point within the defensive traditional just war theory, had become particularly unstable, although the second scholastics unflinchingly emphasized that nobody, not even the infidels or pagans, could be forcefully deprived of their possessions (life, objects, territories, reputation), and that, whoever suffered injustice of that kind, had the right to resist. The problem was that individual perceptions and objective evidence of just possession did not always concur, and that knowledge of these might be faulty or erroneous. Vitoria was acutely aware of this problem: he believed that warring parties -even "the Turks and the Saracens" -did not act in bad faith, but that they engaged in war for what they perceived as a just cause, in defense against an aggressor or to recover possessions. While humanists concluded that just causes could exist on both sides, the theologian Vitoria maintained that, as war could only be justified as an answer to injustice, this was a logical impossibility: one side had to be in a state of objective error, although the agent subjectively did not perceive this. 11 Such subjective misjudgments, current in disputes 5 over legal titles to territories, were difficult to disentangle causing doubts and troubles of conscience on all sides. As acting in doubt was acting in sin, it was necessary to achieve certainty. Thorough counseling and deliberation, as well as negotiation with the opponent, were meant to achieve this, yet, as Vitoria stated, "once the case has been examined as long as is reasonable," the possessor was not required to relinquish the possession. Vitoria's conclusion was coherent with a core principle of moral reasoning, according to which the morally safest (tutior) opinion was to be preferred in cases of doubt. This maxim invariably favored right of the possessor (ius possidentis), but it was not without its tensions, for example when the ruler's right to raise taxes collided with the subjects' right to their property. 12 The probabilist idea put forward by the Dominican Bartolomé de Medina in 1577, that in case of doubt one might prefer a less probable opinion to a more probable one or even to the safest opinion, was a methodological break-through and changed the terms of moral reasoning fundamentally. Medina defined probability as "what is confirmed by very good arguments and the authority of wise men," but he disconnected moral safety from probability, opening new ways of solving moral problems. Moreover, Medina also argued that one could abandon the safest opinion if it was detrimental to oneself. 13 Probabilism was taken up widely, but when it came to war, moral theologians generally held on to the ius possidentis maxim and tried to limit probabilistic undermining of it. 14 probable, he considered it "barbarous", because it privileged the most powerful, who would always find extrinsic evidence (written evidence and judges) to support their cause. In the case of two princes disputing their claims to a territory, he therefore preferred to leave the decision to the res publica to decide for itself. He further suggested that, while doubts and deliberations prevailed, the contested territory could be occupied. The opposed party was then justly entitled to respond with a defensive war. This was possible because whoever believed to have a legitimate claim to a territory could admonish the possessor to prove his competing claim. Any refusal to do so provided the opponent with a just cause against the possessor, because such a refusal was unjust and offensive. The ensuing conflict might look aggressive, but, as a response to injustice, it could be labeled as a just and defensive war fulfilling the definitions commonly shared by all Doctores. 17 As this example shows, the application of probabilism could reduce scholastic just war principles to an empty shell, deepening doubts instead of lifting them. Despite such unraveling of basic Thomist concepts, which cannot be explored in full here, the nimbus of bellum iustum remained strong. With respect to international and domestic audiences declarations of war, for example, continued to invoke its framework. Where this proved impossible, as in the Swedish intervention in the Thirty Years War, the notion of "war" was by consequence evacuated altogether and replaced by a terminology of armed intervention.
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Religious war?
Caussin's reliance on Navarro's scholastic framework makes it unlikely that he favored war on religious reasons. Furthermore, the majority of the second scholastics, be they Dominicans 24 The punishment of heresy could include the confiscation of property, and princes were no exception to this. Rulers who had been sentenced and condemned as heretics might hence be deprived by the Church of their right to govern. Yet, although he stressed, more clearly than Bellarmine even, that papal power might also comprise the imposition of temporal and material punishments, he did not discuss explicitly the idea that a war against heretic princes was a duty that followed ipso facto. In one single line, Suárez declared it a "probable" opinion, that a Catholic prince might wage such a war upon papal commitment, but he did not explore this point at any length. 25 Just war was radically different from the punishment of heresy, as Suárez stressed throughout his discussion of it in the separate book on charity (De Charitate). Like Molina he staunchly rejected Castro's and the canonists' positions that founded just causes in religion.
Such causes were "false" and "vain," because "God had not given all men the power to avenge his injuries," something He could have done should He have wished to. But He clearly
had not "because this would cause major perturbations." 26 Suárez seconded Molina in his view on how to interpret the Canaanite example correctly, and interestingly he added further arguments, indebted to Vitoria; he elaborated that the Canaanites' obstruction of common 9 roads of communication as well as their practice of human sacrifice were more convincing just causes. These, he insisted, were possible just causes; they were not founded in religion but in natural law. Finally Suárez turned to the last bastion of religious war: the pope's universal power. Although, in the chapter on heresy, he had given a very large scope to the extent of papal power over Christians in the spiritual and temporal sphere, in the context of just war he insisted on its limits. In his role as head of Christianity the pope held no direct temporal, but only spiritual power over Christians, and none whatsoever over pagans or infidels. Suárez' conclusion was dry and succinct: Christian princes could not wage war unless for reasons founded in the law of nature and for the defense of the innocent, which excluded all "false titles," because "the law of grace did not abolish but perfect the law of nature." 27 One might conclude by analogy that heresy therefore could at best be an accessory aspect but never a cause of just war. This is, however, difficult to settle definitely, due to the fundamental distinction between infidels and pagans on one side and apostates and heretics on Christian prince? These were far more uncertain queries, and it is significant that Suárez in his analysis of just war only examined alliances with "idolatrous" rulers, a vaguer concept than heresy. 28 As he had stated in De Fide, idolatry did not diminish the right to exercise political power and it was no cause for just war. 29 The promotion of idolatry by force ("vis") alone was no argument either; only violent coercion ("coactio") and a call for help by the entire res publica might provide valid causes for military interventions. Again this derived from the law of nature (protection of the innocent) not from religion. 30 When it came to alliances with infidels (not with heretics!) his answers were even more nebulous. As the marginalia announce, "the doubts are answered by examples." These were drawn from the Old Testament and they worked both ways. 31 If the Israelites used wild beasts for war, why not employ infidels? On the other hand, there were also warning examples of divine punishment for those who, because they had lost trust in God's providence, had asked the impious for help. 32 of whether the means employed served the right purpose of helping another in the accomplishment of an act of justice. 36 As to the causes of just war in general, he extended the idea of vindication of damage and injustice from a question of possession to a question of religion. As probable opinions were sufficient in matters of morality, war against condemned heretics, was to be deemed a perfectly just cause, "because heresy causes the greatest harm to the res publica Christiana." 37 Candido, interestingly, did not limit such war to a specific papal command.
Two points may be retained in the light of these few examples: scholastic theologians for conceptual reasons were unable to come to terms with religious war, and they were Grisons policy with a variety of publications to counter the attacks by ultramontane Catholic radicals. 39 One of the main targets in the French pamphlets was the Spanish tradition of theological counsel in politics, probably out of fear that such modes of government might appeal to devout Catholics in France and lead them to question Richelieu's strategy. 40 Priests and theologians, the polemicists argued, did not help to unburden the royal conscience or to 13 resolve conflict peacefully: they burdened the conscience, and by spreading moral doubts they spread dissent and disruption, favoring Spanish hegemony across the globe. 41 43 The authors stripped down the arguments for just war to the canonist rule based on Augustine, according to which combat is justified if it is undertaken not out of desire or lust for glory, but for mere necessity. Faithful assistance to one's allies was a necessity and a just cause, and canon law supported this. 44 Furthermore, the king of France possessed the right authority, as well as the just intention that scholastics prized so highly. Royal authority, they argued was directly derived from God, and 14 this included the right to use the sword. The God of Hosts, who, as the Old Testament taught, waged war against infidels and who crushed rebellious subjects, had passed his authority on to secular rulers to do the same in the name of the state. 45 Thus, an argument traditionally invoked to justify religious war, was transformed to declare war in the name of the state as a holy exercise. By consequence, subjects did not possess the right to doubt the justice of war: conscience with examining the justice of war, had never denied their right to do so. 47 The French pamphleteers categorically denied the relevance of scholastics and casuistry, because "the maxims of the school are irrelevant in politics." They were inadequate foundations of political judgment and a means of deceit and destruction. Casuists had invented scruples and doubts as "narcotics" to paralyze the French and to favor Spanish interests. 48 This did not prevent the French pamphleteers from adapting some scholastic maxims to their own ends. Abolishing the distinction between heresy and infidelity, they stated that heresy did not diminish a ruler's sovereignty and that thus heretics were legitimate allies. 49 Like Candido, the authors quoted the example of Charles V, but while the papal theologian had done so to support the legitimacy of alliances with heretics, the French writers used this example to denounce Spanish double standards. Lumping together the entire "Gotha" of sixteenth-century theologians under the label of "scholastics", and even twisting precise passages from Vitoria's lectures on war, they declared theological counsel a farce. 50 It was indistinguishable from the "counsels of Machiavelli" and in the end Spanish "soldiers robbed, killed and pillaged like those of other nations." counsel on war was a Trojan horse: problems of conscience were raised, not out of genuine concern for the king's conscience, but out of cupidity and Spanish partiality. 54 In the words of the French writers scholastic theology was intrinsically "criminal" as it suggested crimes to the tribunal of conscience where there were none. It perverted the natural obedience of subjects as well as paternal authority in general by raising the issue of royal sins and doubtful royal conscience in the first place. Therefore, French political advisors, the chancellor, the cardinal and many others, as assembled in the royal council, need not feel 16 unqualified by comparison: they too were pious, they and their forefathers had fought against heresy and they were "zealots" when it came to the "bien de l'estat." All this was "for us a true counsel of conscience." 
Pacifying the Old Testament
The conflict between Caussin and Richelieu has mostly been reconstructed from the account Richelieu gave in his memoirs. 59 Caussin's views have received less attention and it has gone largely unnoticed that the former confessor explained himself in additions to his most famous and hugely successful work, the Cour Sainte, when the Cardinal's death put an end to his exile in 1643. 60 The ways in which he now presented his arguments, however, prove that he too no longer relied solely on the force of scholastic discussions of just war. Probably well aware that the polemics of the 1620s had damaged their efficacy, particularly amongst the In his introduction to the edition of 1647, Caussin insisted that the confessor, in order to fulfill his office, had to refer back to Azpilcueta's standard manual for confessors of a century earlier, and he reprinted Navarro's questionnaire for royal penitents verbatim.
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Concerning just war, this resulted in banishing all contrasting scholastic discussions in favor of Azpilcueta's emphasis that Christian princes must seek and maintain peace in order to 18 counter the enemies of Christendom effectively. Caussin had insisted on this point already in 1637, but while back then he had still referred to the authority of the scholastic writers on just war, in 1647 he abandoned all references to them. 63 Hand in hand with this return to Azpilcueta went a firm warning against probabilist concessions that had affected moral theology since. Confessors "should not try to follow extraordinary propositions that tend to render the king's conscience loose nor should the confessor prejudice the people or the state ...
he must incline to the things that are in the pure light of nature and the Gospel, he must walk straight and not succumb to less pure opinions." 64 He circumvented the discussion of whether war alongside heretics might be unjust, a point on which scholastics had not been very precise anyhow; instead he put the focus firmly on the unity of Christian princes. to God's law? 65 Caussin, however, did not justify his re-affirmation of the confessor's competence with the Bellarminian idea of the confessor as an expression of indirect spiritual power. 66 Theories on indirect papal power had caused massive controversy in France, and since the readmission of the Jesuit order in Paris had depended on abandoning the teaching of his doctrine within their colleges in France, Caussin's silence on this matter was probably wise. 67 The reaffirmation of the confessor's authority therefore had to rely on other, more acceptable sources. Caussin found them in Old Testament prophecy.
Banking on the power of prophecy was an ambiguous enterprise. As the phenomenon of self-appointed prophets spread throughout Europe in the early seventeenth century, religious authorities regarded claims to prophecy with increasing suspicion. The reasons for this are evident: as Weber pointed out, charismatic prophets generally challenge the "technicians of routine cults," which is why priests and prophets can be regarded as conflicting ideal-types. 68 Caussin's recovery of prophecy was not tinged with any subversion of priestly power, however: his prophetic models -Elijah, Elisha, Isaiah and Jeremiah -did not belong to the category of seers, like Daniel, but to those who warned and criticized rulers.
Exclusively inspired by divine truth and devoid of self-interest, they alone, according to Munich, had resisted compromise and peace with fervent holy war discourses on the same grounds. Caussin must have been aware that they had justified the ongoing war in religious terms, holding up the authority of the Old Testament and referring continually to divine revelation and prophecy. 78 They had thrown overboard the scholastic reticence concerning religious grounds for war, arguing that whoever agreed peace with the "heretics" did so only with convenience on their minds and because they lacked faith in God's providence and his promise of victory. Caussin was more skeptical as to such claims. He belonged to those who doubted the very concept of holy war based on the example of Israel. 79 Caussin fought all sides: he opposed the militant theologians as well as the French reason of state arguments which had disgraced him, and he countered both with his highly peculiar and personal adaptation of stories from the Old Testament. Although he effectively returned to strict Thomist principles and to Navarro's conservative exhortation to Christian unity, he refrained from extensive references to the scholastic tradition. Instead biblical history served as reservoir of "truth", while the prophets supplied confessors with an authoritative model from which to derive their legitimacy as voices of conscience.
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Caussin's choice probably reveals a coming to terms with the fact that the scholastic tradition of just war had entered its final stages and that it had been irreparably damaged by the crisis of probabilism and by the debates that had surrounded its role during the FrancoSpanish power struggle. Caussin's reasoning was also indicative of a wider theological trend, which set in around the middle of the seventeenth century, in which "biblical truth" was played out against mere opinions based on scholastic speculation. By anchoring the confessor's mission in the prophetical model he claimed a less contested terrain, in which he could combine the idea of authority with the duty of truthful counsel. Yet, despite his insistence on prophetical authority, Caussin also delivered a skeptical lesson. His chapter on Jeremiah in particular illustrated that even prophets could fail in preventing monarchs from lurching into devastation and destruction. Caussin did not hide, but emphasize that the best prophets generally found themselves despised, humbled and exiled.
In 1650, just after the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia, Caussin returned to the question of war and peace in an open exhortation to peace directed at all Christian princes and, in particular, at Louis XIV, who was coming of age. In his Angelus Pacis (1650), which was immediately translated into English, Caussin remembered the validity of Aquinas's principles of just war and he reiterated his skepticism as to quoting the Old Testament in support of religious war. 80 All princes had claimed religious causes, leading to a logical paradox, which could only mean that these causes were either vain, or that they hid something else. According to Caussin the true cause of the war-mongering had been partisan jealousy and greed instilled by secular counselors pretending to uphold the reason of state. With unrestrained irony he turned back to the way in which the French Valtelline pamphlets had attacked the sources and authorities of scholastic learning. 81 Royal favorites who had participated in this demolition of right reason were to blame for having pushed their monarchs 25 to pursue a war that had laid the continent in ruins. Most princes had engaged in the war with Christian intentions, but as the war dragged on, these had become irrelevant. Caussin makes a highly interesting and novel point by showing that even just wars ultimately turned unjust: "If some Warres be just, if some be necessary, yet whilst they are protracted, they cease to be what they were, they lose their innocence by the very diuturnity, and whilst they increase in fury, they decrease in cause and reputation." 82 If the past could not be mended, Caussin at least wanted to draw some lessons for the future, and like a prophet he went on to warn of new dangers that undermined the foundations of the European order: by pressuring their subjects for money to finance wars they could no longer justify conclusively, European monarchs ran the risk of undermining their own authority. Subjects had started to "hate Monarchy, and (which is absolutely unlawful) [to] conspire to withdraw their Obedience." 83 Caussin carefully avoided explicit allusions to the ongoing Fronde which had been triggered by such fiscal strains, and pointed across the Channel instead. England, he warned, was only the beginning, and more royal heads would roll if European princes failed to establish a peaceful order. Thus, advocating peace was not a sign of Christian naïveté, but of true understanding of reason of state. 
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